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THE ROLE OF LAW IN SOCIAL CHANGE
DANIEL R. MANDELKER*

We find ourselves living in a period of social stress in which increasing
demands for major reform have been made on our political institutions,
especially as they affect the governance of our urban areas. It is against this
background that I want to concentrate on the role of the law in social
change, and especially on the role that courts can play in this effort. As
lawyers, we are more comfortable in our traditional adversary role than in
any other, and so we have looked in large measure to the courts as the
appropriate forum in which to make our plea for social reconstruction. I
will argue, however, that the role that courts can play in major social reform is
limited, and that we should not expect too much from the judicial process.
Effective judicial intervention in social controversy requires a consensus
on the goals and objectives of social change, at a time in history when it is
our failure as a society to agree on the goals and objectives of social
change that is one of the principal causes of social unrest.
Social Order and the Legal System
My point of beginning is simply that the legal system as we know it was
influenced by an earlier and very different concept of the social order than now
prevails, and that judicial response to issues of social controversy reflects
this less complex social system. Let me illustrate the point very briefly with
the case of Patton v. Westwood Country Club,1 a nuisance case which
indicates the limitations of judicial intervention in the context of a simple
dispute over land use.
Defendant in the Westwood case operated a golf club, and plaintiff was
a homeowner who had a dwelling adjacent to one of the golf club's fairways.
She sued in nuisance to enjoin the country club from operating its golf course
in such a way that golf balls landed on her property. The court, after
looking very carefully at the factual situation, and the problems and practices
of golfers, decided that no enjoinable nuisance had in fact occurred. It was
impressed by the fact that the club had, to a considerable extent, taken care
of the stray ball problem by planting a line of trees to shield the plaintiff's
house. Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff had come to the nuisance.
The golf course was there when she built her home, and so she could not now
be heard to complain. The suit was dismissed.
The Westwood case illustrates very nicely some points I would like to
make about the social order and how it has come to be reflected in our legal
institutions. Some of these observations have been made before, but they are
*Professor of Law, Washington University.
1 18 Ohio App. 2d 137, 247 N.E.2d 761 (1969).
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worth repeating. The point to stress is that the law until recently dealt with
very small institutions and very small aggregates of economic power, at least
when it considered controversies over the management of urban resources.
Westwood Country Club may control 100 acres of golfing on the fringes of
Cleveland, but the Westwood Country Club is not a very large economic
aggregate. On the other hand, the public housing authority of the City of
New York is a very large aggregate of economic, social, and political power.
Until recently, until 1937 in the case of public housing, we did not have in the
United States the legal basis for the accumulation of potentially large
aggregates of power in the public sphere.
As a result, the legal controversies which arose in the conduct of these
small power aggregates were concentrated at the scale of the individual, or
at best, clusters of individuals or small groups. The plaintiff in the Westwood
case was a single homeowner, and the case is typical of the conventi6nal land
use controversy which arose out of simple two-party relationships, and which
concentrated on the narrowly-defined interests around which these relationships revolved. In this kind of case, the attention of the court was focused on
conflict resolution on a very small scale. The purpose of the Westwood
litigation, after all, was to see if the court ought to do something about golf
balls that went out of bounds on one of the defendant's fairways. Within
so limited a context, the legal system could not deal with the larger
distributive problems which such a case might raise, as distinguished from
the narrower allocative problems which the court considered in the context
of a nuisance lawsuit. That is, the court in the Westwood case could not
decide (a) whether the country club was in the wrong place, or (b) that its
membership was too restricted, or (c) that it ought to be larger, or (d) that
not enough of the right people were playing golf, or (e) that residences in
the Cleveland area ought to be located in different places in relation to
social and recreational facilities.
It was difficult for a judicial system attuned to conflict resolution
on a small scale to deal with these larger distributive questions. Providing
opportunities for golf may not be one of the burning social issues of our day,
and the distribution of recreational facilities not all that important to
achieving social equality. But in other areas of social conflict the narrow
focus of judicial attention to the immediate dispute has meant neglect of the
disadvantaged in our society. They are the ones most likely to assert the
need to deal with distributive issues, and they are most likely to be excluded
from the confines of conventional litigation. We can trace some of the
difficulty to the assumptions which underlie the decision in the Westwood
case, which illustrates the tendency of the law to structure claims and
interests in the use of urban resources in a property framework. This approach
would disenfranchise those who, economically, had no property interest to
assert. Urban renewal is a case in point. It was for this reason that
families who had been renting slum dwellings on a monthly basis, and who
were displaced from urban renewal projects, were found initially to have no
property interest which the court could seize as the basis for giving them
their day in court.
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The law also tended to ignore interdependent relationships. Probably
this attitude arose from the fact that claims were not only presented by
individual litigants, but were considered under the assumption that society
was characterized by independencies and not interdependencies in its social
and economic relations. Nuisance law was an exception, and though the
Westwood case is a modem example of the use of nuisance doctrine to deal
with interdependencies in land use, we should observe that even in this
context the court moved to deal with these problems in a very limited frame
of reference. Nevertheless, as a rule the problem of interdependent relationships on the large scale was ignored.
I think it essential in looking at problems arising in an urban context
to face the dependency question directly, and to agree, if possible, on how
we want to characterize for purposes of legal inquiry the fundamental nature
of social relationships in an urban setting. Economists worry about these
problems. They worry about whether or not society is characterized as a
general rule by independent or interdependent relationships, and much of
economic inquiry proceeds on the premise that it is the interdependencies
in the social and economic order that are dominant. As lawyers, we need to
decide whether the economists are right, and whether our own emphasis on
the independent quality of individual action is misplaced.
Allocative and Distributive Roles in Legal Reform
If we look at what passes for legal reform from the perspective we have
been taking, we can see that when the courts have intervened they have not
concentrated on the interdependent problems of distribution to which we have
referred. Instead, the courts have been asked to look at allocative issues,
and the thrust of legal reform has been to demand a larger voice in the
existing system for those who have been excluded from its benefits. In other
words, legal reform has worked from the older model of the legal order.
Efforts at change have been in the direction of reforming that model to get
it to work better within the assumptions and limitations it accepted, by
giving greater power to those who did not have the leverage to gain entry
to enforce their demands.
My response to this kind of reforming effort is cautionary. I have come
to feel that the expenditure of legal energy in this direction, while essential,
will in the long run have a limiting effect on what we accomplish. Let me say
immediately that I am not suggesting that giving power to the weak in our
legal system is not an essential component of any effort at social change.
I do not consider this activity unessential, but in the long run I feel that
it may not achieve all that we expect in the solution of more fundamental
social issues.
Let me go back to my earlier observation about the role of property and
the property interest in the settlement of controversies related to wealth
distribution. Urban renewal remains a classic example, because it is a prime
case of an extremely complex distributional system which has visited
substantial harm on those who are caught in its legal processes and who have
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a minimum of legal protection. In short, in plain English, a lot of people
get hurt in urban renewal. Very often they are racial and economic minorities
who are displaced from their homes in urban renewal project areas and who
are forced to move elsewhere.
Quite early in the history of urban renewal, disadvantaged groups who
were displaced from their homes brought lawsuits challenging the right of the
renewal agency to eject them in the face of inadequate replacement housing.
The question was whether they had enough leverage on the legal system to
demand their day in court, and initially the response was unfavorable, partly
for reasons we have already indicated. Litigants in these cases were asserting
interests outside the narrower kinds of controversies which urban renewal
had produced, such as lawsuits between the renewal agency and a protesting
landowner alleging a lack of public purpose. However, displaced litigants
who were not property owners had no property interest to protect which the
law had so far been willing to recognize, and so courts asked to fashion
remedial decrees to protect their rights found themselves without the necessary
leverage to take charge.
In recent years, the current of judicial decisions has tended to run the
other way, and in the United States at least the courts are beginning to
give litigants displaced by urban renewal their day in court. In doing so,
the courts have given recognition to the interests these litigants represent,
even though they are not founded on the protection of property. These
judicial developments in urban renewal illustrate the modem thrust of
judicial intervention in the name of reform. It must accept the allocation
of benefit and burden which the urban renewal system commands. The only
difference is that previously excluded groups have now been given their day
in court to challenge the fairness and the sufficiency with which these
allocations are made.
To some extent, these developments are a modem echo of what
happened in the law of labor relations at the time of the American New Deal.
At that time, the labour union, like the urban renewal displacee, had an
uncertain legal standing. The extent to which collective bargaining was
judicially protected was very much in doubt, if it was protected at all. A lot of
thought was given to going beyond the minimum requirements of a Fair
Labor Standards Act, and to changing the distributional rules under which
wealth is shared. This response was rejected, as you may remember, and a
decision was made to enact a statute at the national level which would give
bargaining power to an institution which so far had not possessed it - the
labour union. The hope was that by giving the labour union the legal
standing to speak for group interests which so far had been unrepresented, its
share of production would be increased through bilateral bargaining. But the
corporate and industrial structure was left untouched.
Reforms which affect controversies in the urban sphere are moving in the
same direction. Courts are giving legal standing to disadvantaged groups so
that they may assert their claims to fairer treatment in urban programs which
are now managed by very large rather than small aggregates of economic
power, just as the disorganized worker in the early years of this century faced
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large aggregates of private economic power with which he had to deal. But
the case of the workingman was simpler. It was one thing to give legal
standing to labour unions in the hope that they would force an increase in
labor's economic share. It is quite another to give voice to newly-recognized
groups in an area such as urban policy-making, in which our goals are not
only uncertain but in many cases conflicting. Under extreme conditions of
goal uncertainty, recognizing new claimants in the allocative process introduces new protagonists with new values which that process has so far chosen
not to accept. They are not content with changing the basis of allocation
alone, for the effect of their intervention is to make demands on the rules of
distribution which courts, at least, find difficult to handle.
Race, Renewal and Reform
We can get an insight into some of these difficulties by returning to
our urban renewal relocation problem, and by investigating the judicial
decisions which have given a hearing to those who have been uprooted and
forced to move in the urban renewal process. One of the more famous of
these cases is Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,2 decided
by a United States Federal Court of Appeal. Let us first note that the Norwalk
case, like most of the other recent cases on this issue, was brought by
minority groups who alleged discrimination in relocation in an urban renewal
project in Norwalk, Connecticut. It is no accident that courts have seized
hold of the renewal process in the name of racial discrimination. It is the
protection the constitution gives minority groups which opens an avenue for
judicial entry, and which avoids the more difficult problems presented by
an attack on the renewal program through the property interest approach.
Unfortunately, while it is the racial side of the case which triggers the
court's intervention, it is just in this area of concern that public policy is not
only unformulated but unsure. We can see these difficulties if we inspect more
closely the factual basis of the Norwalk lawsuit. The facts were many-sided,
but what strikes us in a careful reading of the opinion is a reference two or
three times to the fact that Negroes had been forced to leave Norwalk because
of the activities and operations of the Norwalk urban renewal authority. The
court appeared to view the fact that Negroes had to leave Norwalk as a bad
thing and not as a good thing.
Let us look at this conclusion for a moment. We now have some recent
evidence from the United States Bureau of the Census on the character and
extent of Negro migration to cities. This evidence suggests that Negro
migration to cities is slowing down. It also suggests that Negroes are more
urbanized as a group than whites, that they have been in cities longer, and
that they have been moving up in the urban place hierarchy from smaller
cities to larger cities. If we assume that the opportunities to achieve a
better standard of living are greater in larger cities than they are in
smaller towns, and some of our colleagues in economies have told us so, then
2395

F.2d 920 (2nd cir. 1968).
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this upward urban movement of Negroes is not entirely a bad thing. The fact
is that Norwalk, Connecticut, is not a big city, and so I raise this question:
If economic improvement is the value we are trying to maximize, then the fact
that Negroes left Norwalk may very well have been good and not bad. I say
"may" because I am not sure; I don't know. All I am saying is that if we
agree that the urban system is complex, interdependent, and interconnected,
then a complex set of interrelated policies and values is implicated in any
decision that touches on the racial fairness with which any one program is
conducted.
Let us look at this problem from a slightly different perspective. Up
until recently, as we have said, the courts had closed most if not all avenues
of judicial redress to those groups who were disadvantaged by the operation
of many of our urban programs. Whatever redress was available had to come
from those agencies, usually federal or local, which were charged with
program administration. Unfortunately, at least on the racial issue, redress
was not forthcoming from the political and administrative side.
It is certainly no secret that the racial impact of many of our federally
supported urban programs was simply compromised at the federal level
because of the crosscurrents of opinion on racial problems in the United
States, and because these programs were not adopted with the racial problem
primarily in mind. Public housing, to return to this example, was initiated
in order to improve housing opportunities for those who could not compete
in the housing market. It was not adopted as a program primarily aimed at
Negroes, and for years the federal public housing agency adopted a position
on integration in public housing projects which many saw as an improper
compromise on the racial question. The same point can be made about urban
renewal, which was adopted (in spite of polemic to the contrary) as a legal
method to expedite the land assembly process in large cities for purposes of
slum clearance, redevelopment, and the improvement of the urban tax base.
For years it was true that most of those who were displaced by renewal
were Negroes because Negroes are poorer than whites and are to be found
in greater numbers in slum areas. I am willing to accept for the moment
that most urban renewal agencies did not consciously adopt a policy of Negro
clearance for the sake of Negro clearance alone.
But even if they did it was clear for a long time that Congress was not
willing to legislate against this practice, and that the federal urban renewal
agency was equally unresponsive. Nor should we have expected a federal
agency representing large city interests concerned with economic revival to
take a forthright stand on race. With the normal avenues of political redress
closed, disadvantaged groups turned next to the courts for help, and as the
courts have intervened in these disputes they have become politicized. That
is, they have intervened to decide those questions of policy and priority
which the political agencies were willing to leave alone.
True, the purpose of judicial intervention in a case like Norwalk is to
impose on local agencies the obligation to be racially neutral, if not racially
compensatory, in the administration of their programs. But the point is that
the courts cannot become implicated in the racial issue without opening up
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for examination the entire question of urban policies and priorities, for none
of these problems can be approached in isolation. In the Norwalk case, the
court became aware at one point that solving the problems of Negroes
displaced by urban renewal in that city might require an order mandating the
city to construct more public housing. Understandably, the court held back
from so drastic a step.
This discussion of racial problems simply illustrates our concern with
the contribution that can be made by judicial intervention, for the fact is
that whenever we make a decision about program impact on the Negro
community we say something about the character of the program itself.
Unfortunately, since we do not know as a society what values we are trying
to maximize in our urban programs we sometimes move in conflicting
directions at the same time. For example, a federal district court in Chicago
ordered the Chicago public housing authority to build scattered public
housing projects in very small concentrations, in order to advance the objective
of racial integration.3 A few years earlier, a comprehensive plan adopted for
that same city had called for tripling the production of public housing units in
Chicago over the next 15 years, in order to meet low income housing needs. 4
My point is that the output of public housing cannot be increased by that
magnitude without using wholesale construction methods, including no doubt
the building of large projects on large tracts, an approach foreclosed by the
court decree in the public housing segregation case. It may be, if concentration
of the public housing supply has negative effects on racial integration of the
projects, that we can only achieve racial integration by sacrificing the public
housing contribution to low income housing.
Values and Variables in Urban Policy-Making
We can acquire a better understanding of the limitations on judicial
consideration of these larger policy issues by turning to the analysis of
expertise in decision-making which is contained in Professor Alan Altshuler's
book on The City Planning Process.5 Altshuler is concerned with how
expertise is defined, and he concentrates on the city planner and related urban
professionals. He notes that these professionals gain credibility by claiming
a competence to make judgments on issues that are defined by a limited
number of variables. Professionals are very careful in selecting the variables
which limit their expertise, and the most successful tend to limit narrowly
the variables over which they claim a concern. He gives as an example the
highway engineer, who confines himself to decisions limited to optimizing
traffic flows. Altshuler then suggests that the selection of the variables
which are considered critical to judgment carries with it the selection of
the values we are trying to implement. For example, it can be argued that
public housing planners made important and critical value judgments when
8 Gautreaux v.

Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111. 1969).
4 Chicago Department of Development and Planning, The Comprehensive Plan of

Chicago 77 (1966).
5 A. A. Altshuler, The City PlanningProcess c. 6 (1965).
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they decided (at one time) to build massive, high-rise projects in order to
minimize cost and maximize the housing contribution. By not considering the
racial impact of their policies they ignored the racial variable and, as a result,
fostered racial segregation in the projects they built.
Altshuler points out that law contemplates a decision-making process
which does not claim legitimacy through selection of a limited number of
variables, and so is carried out under conditions in which goals are highly
uncertain. The legal process avoids the problems of goal selection by
slipping around them, claiming its credibility on the basis of collective
rational decision-making through the process of incremental change. I would
argue that whenever the American judiciary refuses substantive intervention
in urban controversies we have a classic example of judicial avoidance of
the tough questions that require value judgments. But courts may not shrink
from a decision forced by racial inequities, even though that decision may
carry value-laden judgments with it. The trouble is that introducing the
racial variable simply introduces additional values for consideration, in
the absence of guiding criteria to work out the conflicts that occur once
the basis for decision has been broadened. I think we would all agree that
the forum to work out these conflicts in values as they do occur is political,
and that the judicial process is ill-suited to the task of political compromise.
It is in the absence of political attention to these value conflicts that the courts
have been enlisted by litigants who demand a hearing.
There is another deficiency in the use of the judicial process in conflict
resolution, and it is here that we see more clearly the limitations of a
judicially reformist role which seeks merely to introduce new claimants into
the allocation system. The problem is that it is very difficult for the
judicial process, on its own, to fashion new remedies for the redress of
claims that do not get full consideration in the legal system as it now exists.
To return to our relocation problem, probably the best that the judicial process
can do, unaided, is to require fairness in the administration of the relocation
effort, assuming that the court chooses not to stop the renewal program
altogether. It is clear that a court, on its own, can do nothing about
money flows, interest rates, and subsidy levels, all of which directly affect the
production and distribution of housing in our economy and mean more to
the success of a relocation effort than any relief a court might provide.
What role should the lawyer and the law then play in this process of
reform which appears so necessary as the legal structure adapts to changes
in the social order? I think the law has a role to play, and I think that
it comprehends more than the representation of new claimants who make
new demands on the existing system. Through the agency of the lawyer, the
law can make a significant contribution by assisting the political decisionmaker in drawing those linkages between values and variables which must be
understood before the distributive choices inherent in the legal system can
be redefined. For example, we might look at Negro migration patterns in the
context of urban renewal policies, isolate a series of variables which we
may want to maximize in this area, and then describe a series of legal options
which can best implement those policies which are chosen. For example, if we
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decide that Negro dispersion is the important problem in urban renewal,
and if we decide that we want to maximize that dispersion, then we might
adopt a series of policies on relocation assistance, housing subsidies, and
housing location which will encourage that dispersion to take place. And we
will have to argue to a court of law that dispersion under these conditions is
not an unconstitutional discrimination. Here, I believe, is where we, as
lawyers, must learn to function. We must try to understand the values which
our public programs make operational. We must then make explicit the linkages
between the value judgments which the political process chooses to adopt, and
the variables on which we choose to act. Only then may the legal system move
beyond its allocative role, to make the distributional choices that are
necessary to any program of social reform.

